Cornell University Though syntacticians have devoted considerab le effort to elucidating the mapping between S-structure and LF, relatively little atte ntion bas been paid to the mapping betwee n S structure/LF and If (=logical fonn , i.e. truth conditional semantics or 'real' semantics). It will be argued in this paper that recent extensions of standard X' -theory to so-called 'functional' (non-lexical) categories provide the crucial link between the syntactically motivated representations of LF and the semantically motivated representations of If. Specifically, it will be claimed that there is a small set of functional categories in nominals, paralle l to those that have been posited for sentences, which are strongly motivated on both syntactic and semantic grounds. What this means is that given a semantically motivated logic for natural language, positing these functional categories provides, on the one hand, syntactic representations that com:ct1y acco unt for the syntactic properties of nominals and, on the other hand, a universal and maximally 'transparent' compositional mapping of syntactic representations onto the representations of If, using only a limited range of semantic operations such as functional application and type-shifting.
Before discussing and justifying these claims in detail, it is fust necessary to summarize the results of my previous work on predication and the structure of propositions (B owers (1991». The analysis of nominals proposed in this paper is tightly integrated with the analysis of sentences proposed there. Indeed, the strong paralle lism between sentential and nominal structure that results from my analysis of nominals constitutes a crucial piece of evidence in its support.
The Syntax of Sentences
It is claimed in Bowers (1991) that the universal canonical D-structure of sentences (apart from onJer) is the following: Embodied in this structure are a number of claims having to do with (1) predication; (2) direct objects; (3) indirect objects and complements. I discuss each of these topics in tum.
Predication
A major unresolved question in the generative framework is whether main clause (MC) and small clause (SC) predication can be unified in purely SbUctural tenDs. In (2) are e�mplified a range of conSbUctions that might reasonably be characterized as 'small clauses', some with PRO subjects, others analogous to ECM constructions:
(2) In (3) are illustrated a number of proposed structures for SCS:
(3) a.
'SC'
NP XI>
b.
xp (Stowell) c.
Clearly, none of these SbUctureS have anything in common with the standard SbUCture for main clauses, regardless of whether the internal subject hypothesis is assumed or not:
(4) a. Suppose, however, there is a functional category 'Pr' intenn ediate between I and V, which projects its own phrasal categories just like other lexical and functional categories. Predication can then unifonn ly represented as foll ows:
(5) 
VP
Not only does hypothesizing the category Pr unify MC and SC predication, providing a purely structural characterizatio n of the predication relation, but it also solves a related problem, namely, what category to assign SCS to: it is simply the maximal projection of Pr. Moreoever, it does so within the limitations of a uniform 2-level version of X-bar theory, unlilce other proposals such as Fukui (1986) , and without invoking the use of base generated adjuncts, as in Stowell (1981) (ill ustrated in (3) b.) and Koopman and Sportiche (1985, 87) . A further bonus of this theory is that it solves a minor but significant mystery of English grammar , namely, how to categorize the element as, which appears in SC constructions such as (2) b. It can simply be regarded as a visible realization of the category Pr. Finally, as will be discussed in 12, the category Pr provides the syntactic basis for uniform semantic theory of predication.
I now summarize briefly some empirical arguments that support positing a universal syntactic category Pr. One such argument can be derived from the fact that constituents consisting of a direct object and complements of various kinds can, quite generally, be conjoined:
(7) a. Mary considers John a fool and Bill a wimp.
b. John regards professors as strange and politicians as creep y. c. Sue put the books on the table and the records on the chair.
d Harri et gave a mug to John and a scarf to Vivien. e. I expect John to win and HaITy to lose. f. We persuaded Mary to leave and Sue to stay.
g. You eat the fISh raw and the beef cooked.
h. I convinced John that it was late and Bill that it was early. i. They told Sue who to talk to and Virginia when to leave.
Clearly, such Sb'Uctures are impossible to generate under the standard analysis of VP. In the theory proposed here, on the other hand, they are easily analyzable as instances of across-the-board extraction of V from a conjoined VP:
'Pfp r vS P We know on the basis of comparative evidence that non-auxiliary verbs don't raise to 1 in English (Emonds (1978) , Pollock (1989». Hence, the A TB extraction of V required in these structures is only possible if there is an xO position betwee n 1 and V which the extracted verb can be located in. The needed head position is, 1 suggest, Pr. l Independent evidence for this conclusion can be derived from RNR sentences (Larson (1990» such as the fo llowing in which the raised constituent must be a VP containing a V trace:
(9) a. Smith loaned, and his widow later donated, a valuable collection of manuscripts to the library.
b. Sue moved, and Mary also transfeITed, her business to a different location.
c. 1 succe eded in convincing, even though John had failed to persuade, Mary not to leave. d We didn't particularly like, but nevertheless ate, the fish raw. e. Most people probably consider, even though the courts didn't actually find, Klaus von Bulow guilty of murder.
f. Flo desperately wants, though she doesn't really expect, the Miami Dolphins to be in the Superbowl.
Further evidence for the existence of Pr can be derived from the familiar observation that predicative expressions of different syntactic category can be conjoined:
(10) a. 1 consider John crazy and a foo l. PJO, the fonn er being exactly parall el to (11), the latter ruled out as a violation of the constraint on conjunction just mentioned.
Subjects and Objects
Modern research has revealed many fonn al syntactic similarities between subjects and objects, a number of which are listed below:
(12) i. The subject c-commands everything else in clause; the object c-commands everything but the subject (Barss and Lasnik (1986». ii. Both subject and object are assigned structural case (Chomsky (1981 ». iii . Both subject and object can can agree with the verb. iv. Both subject and object control PRO subjects of infmitive and SC complements. v. Both subject and object are possible non-9 positions (postal and Pullum (1988», hence landing sites for NP -Movement.
To account for this parall elism, I follow a line of thought that goes back to at least Chomsky (l9SSnS), Dowty (1982) , Jacobson (1983) and Bowers (1983) , namely, that the verb and its complements form a D-structure constituent which is predicated of the direct object. This notion is further developed in works such as Jacobson (1987) , Bowers (1988, 89) , and Larson (1988) , which claim specifically that direct objects are generated in [Spec, V), parall el to the position of subjects in [Spec, Prj. According to this view, a sentence such as John will put the boo k on the table would be represented as follows:
. Jo e the 000k p d t on tit! I I assume that O-roles are assigned locally to XPs that the verb M-commands, where by 'assigned locally' I mean assigned within the maximal projection of the xO category containing the verb. It follows that V -to-Pr movement is obligatory. I also assume that 0-roles are assigned compositionally (Fukui (1986) , Grimshaw (1990» , going from innennost to outermost constituents. The argument structure associated with verbs is thus represented as follows:
where 9 3 is assigned to the complement of V in V'; 9 2 to the argument in [Spec, V) This strongly suggests that they are licensed by diff erent categories. The problem is that there are at least two further distinct adverb types in English (making a total of four), none of which can be interchanged:
Since the only three categories available as licensers are V, I and C, either another licenser is needed or we must assume that the two types of manner adverb discussed above are both licensed by V. It is shown in Bowers (1991) Following Stowell (1981) , this restriction on the placement of adverbs in English is usually acc ounted for in the literature by means of the so-called "adjacency requirement" on case assignment, which stipulates basicall y that accu sative case can only be assigned by the verb to a NP that it is adj acent to. Apart from the inherent implausibility of restricting case assignment in this way, there are at least two empirical arguments against such an approach. First, adj acency is not a general requirement for case-assignment, even in English, since adverbs can occ ur quite free ly betwee n the subject and the 10 head that assigns it nominative case:
(26) John certainly will win the race.
Second, the adjacency requirement simply doem't hold in many languages, even in typologically quite similar languages such as French (see Bowers (1991) , §3.2. 1., for further discussion):
(27) Jean parle souvent Ie francais.
Hence all that remains of the adjacency requirement is a language-specific condition on assignment of just a single case, namely, accusative, hardly an explanatory theory. In the theory proposed here, in contrast, this restriction on the occmrence of adverbs can be explained in pmely structural tenn s. Fmt of all, the fact that V-licensed adverbs such as pe1/ectly cannot occur between the verb and its direct object follows immedia tely from the assumption that these adverbs are V'-adjuncts, together with the linked hypotheses that direct objects are in [Spec, V] and that the verb raises obligatorily into PrO.
These assumptions jointly ensure that there is simply no way of generating an adverb of this type between the verb and its object in English. Second, these same assumptions ensure that it is impossible to generate adverbs licensed by any other head between the verb and its object Thus a Pr-licensed adverb, for example, will be generable either to the left of the raised verb or to the right of the whole VP complement of PrO, but not in any other position. The possible positions for adverbs pennitted by this theory are indicated in the following structure for (21) a.: is also explainable in pmely structural tenn s, given the analysis proposed here. In fact, all the ordering properties attributed to the adjacency condition on case assignment reduce to a single structural property of English, namely, that it is Spec-initial. Another significant consequence of the claim that subjects and objects are structurall y parallel is the following. Since Spec positions can in general be e'-positions, it should be the case that object position, as well as subject position, is a possible e'-position. In fact, Postal and Pullum (1988) have argued that one of the crucial tests for a a'-position, namely, occ urence of expletives, holds for object po sition as well as subject position. This in t1ml makes it possible, contrary to the cmrent VIeW, to have raising-to-object (RO), as well as raising-to-subject (RS), without violating the a-Criterion. An important empirical argument in support of RO can be derived from the facts of so-called "quantifier floating" in English and other languages. The basic observation, due originally to Maling (1976) , is that certain quantifiers can "float" to the right of the NP they modify under two conditions: (i) if the NP is a subject; (ii) if it is an object that has a predicative complement following it. Crucially, quantifier floating is not possible from objects that lack a predicative complement:
(30) a. The men will all leave.
b. We consider the men all fools/totall y crazy. c. *1 saw the men all. d. *The men were arre sted all. e. *The men arri ved all .
These facts can be elegantly explained under the following assum ptions:
(31) i. Floated quantifiers produced by leftward movement of NP (Sportiche (1988». ii. Raising to object (RO) exists.
iii . Q is adj oined only to PrP and IP .
As shown in (32) a., a stranded quantifier is always possible in subject position, since subjects always move from [Spec, V] to [Spec, Pr] ; more importantly, the possibility of a stranded quantifier in object position also follows if RO exists, as shown in (32) Floating from an obj ect which lacks a complement, as in example (30) These observations lead to the conclusion that goal phrases and dative expressions such as those in (33) c., d., and f. must in general be SC complements with a PRO subject. e. This book cost $10/*$10 was cost by this book.
f. The book cost John $10/*John was cost $10 by the boo k.
A related phenomenon (commonly refem:d to in the literature as "Visser's generalization", though the standard acco unt is Bach (1979» is the fact that transitive subject-control verbs lack passives:
(35) a. *John is impressed (by Bill ) as pompous. b. *The boys were made a good mother (by Aunt Mary). c. *The kids were failed (by Max) as a father. d. *The men were struck by the idea as nonsense. e. *The men were promised (by Frank) to leave.
Interestingly, it has been observed by Maling (1976) that the very same verbs that don't passivize also don't penn it floated quantifiers associated with their objects:
(36) a. *He impresse s his friends all as pompous. b. * Aunt Mary made the boys all a good mother. c. *Max failed the kids all as a father.
d. *The idea struck the men all as nonsense.
e. *Frank promised the men all to leave.
Clearly, this can't be an acc ident, suggesting that there is a structw'al diff erence between direct objects and indirect objects. Let's assume the following structures for sentences with persuatk and promise, respectively: Suppose that the basic constraint on control is simply that PRO must be controlled by the nearest c-commanding NP. The control properties indicated in (38) follow at once.
Maling's observation concerning quantifier floating is simply a corollary of this solution to the control problem, since only in (37) a. does the apparent object c-comm and the floating quantifier in the complement clause. The remaining examples in (35) are exactly like (37) b. in structure except that they contain a SC complement with a PRO subject. An example such as (36) d. would therefore be represented as follows:
. At this point we have pretty much deduced the general argument structure (1) (repeated below), proposed at the outset:
Further support for the correc tness of this structure can be derived from the fact that there are sentences containing all three arguments, a direct object, indirect object and SC or sentential complement:
(41) a. They feed the meat i to the lions PRO i raw.
b. John put the patient i in bedPRO i drunk. (cited in Roberts (1988, 708, n. 3) c. I sent John i to the store PROj to get the paper.
As predicted, the direct object, rather than the indirect object, controls the PRO subject of the complement. I conclude by discussing the interaction of RO with dative arguments and V-licensed adverbs. It has bee n argued that the latter both occ ur in positions subordinate to, and to the right of, the direct object. Therefore, if RO exists, the order of these elements must be as follows:
Remarkably, this prediction is borne out by the facts, as the following data shows:
(43) a. *We proclaimed to the public John to be a hero. b. We proclaimed John to the public to be a hero. c. *We proclaimed sincerely John to be a hero. Historically, one of the main objections to admitting RO as a possible operation in the theory of grammar was the fact that it appe ared to be string vacuous. As the following derivation shows, this particular objection to RO no longer carri es any force:
NP a ge nuirle linguist
Returning finall y to the impassivizable verbs in (34), D01e that in each case there is at least some independent evidence in support of the view that the apparent direct object is reall y an underlying dative argument. The apparent object in examples (34) a. and b. is clearly a directional complement that idiosynaaticall y lacks a preposition, as revealed by related examples such as John went to his/the home (n.b. * John went his/the Iwme), Mary went out of/away from the room, etc. The dative character of the appare nt object in (34) c. shows up in related nominal forms such as John's resemblance to Bill /the resemblance of John to Bill. In the case of examples (34) d and e. it seems more plausible to suppose that the measure expressions 10 lbs. and $10 are predicates of a SC complement and example (34) f. further supprts this hypothesis, since the (impassivizable) dative object optionally occurs to the left of the measure expression.
The Semantics of Sentences
Classical theories of logical semantics assume just two basic types: the type of entities, designated by the symbol 'e', and the type of propositions, designated by the symbol 't'. All other types are derived from these two. Properties are not primitives in such a theory, but rather are reconstructed as propositional functions (I-place predicates, or intransitive verbs), of type <e,t>, which combine with entity expressions to form propositions. 2-place predicates, or transitive verbs, are expressions of type <e,<e,t» , i.e. an expression that combines with an entity expression to form an intransitive verb (which in tum combines with an entity expression to form a proposition). In this way, expressions with any arbitrary number of arguments can be represented, as well as other types of expressions, such as sentence modifiers (of type <t,t» , nominal modifiers (of type <e,e», and so forth. The only problem with adopting the classical type theory as a theory of natural language semantics is, as has frequently bee n noted, that the types provided by the semantics don't necessarily map onto the syntactically motivated categories of natural language in any simple or transparent fashion. Take, for example, a standard set of phrase-structure rules such as the following:
How do the types of classical semantics relate to the categories provided by these rules?
The category S obviously corre sponds to expressions of type t, while VP-expressions are uniformly of type <e,t>. Verbs are of diff erent types, such as <e,t> or <e,<e,t» , depending on how many arguments they require. The relation between classical type theory and the syntactic representations proposed here, on the other hand, is quite opaque. The category PrP would of course corre spond to the type t of propositions and the category VP to the type <e,t> of propositional functions. However, the intervening categories Pr and Pr' corre spond to nothing at all in the semantics. Of course, one can always stipulate in an ad hoc fashion the relation betwee n syntactic rules and semantic types, but considerations of leamability strongly suggest that the principles connecting syntax and logical form should be simple and universal. The strongest possible hypothesis would be that, aside from the syntactic and semantic properties of specific lexical items, the child must learn nothing concerning the relation between syntactic rules and categories and semantic types, the basic mapping being detennined by principles of UG.
I tum now to a rather different approach to the logical semantics of natural language. Following Chierchia (1985 Chierchia ( , 1989 , I will assume that the representations of logical fonn are drawn from a multisorted first-order language with four basic sorts: u, p, 1t, e (the universal sort), plus the predication relation u: 1t -> <e,p> and its inverse ("): <c,p> -> 1t. P is the type of propositions; 1t is the type of properties; and u is the type of basic entities. Since properties and propositions are basic types in this theory, there is no direct connection betwee n them, as there is in the classical theory. Therefore in order to predicate a property of some entity to produce a proposition, it is fIrSt necessary to turn that property into a propositional function, i.e. a ''Fregean" unsaturated structure that must combine with an entity expression to form a proposition. That is precisely the function of the predication operation 'v, which maps property expressions onto propositional functions of type <c,p>. (The inverse operation '(")', which might be tenn ed 'nominalization', maps propositional functions onto properties; it will not concern us further here.) This propositional function then combines with another expression to form an expression of type p, a proposition.
Given this ontology, there is a straightforward corre spondence betwee n the semantics of predication and the syntax of predication proposed in this paper. Assume that the semantic fu nction of Pr is to map properties (expressions of type 1t) into propositional functions (expressions of type <c,p». In short, assume that the translation of Pr in If is simply 'v. Assume in add ition that phrases of category VP map onto expressions of type 1t, as do predicate APs, NPs and PPS. It follows that if r is the translation of a phrase of category YP, of type 1t (regardless of its syntactic category), then the translation of [ Pr' Pr YP] is simply Ur, of type <c,p>, and the translation of PrP is Uru (u an individual of any sort), of type p. There is thus a straightforward, one-to-one mapping betwee n the categories of syntax and the types of their translations in logical fonn . Given a property semantics of this kind, it immediately becomes possible to assign a precise meaning in logical fonn to the hypothesized functional category Pr and to its X-bar projections Pr' and PrP.
Phrases of the category PrP involve what might be termed 'primary predication', to which we have now given a fonn ally precise definition at the level of If. Phrases of category VP, on the other hand, we have suggested are properties, expressions of type 1t. These property expressions can themselves contain one or more arguments and it was argued in § 1.2. that the fonn ation of PrP and the fonna tion of transitive VP are fonn ally parallel in that both involve combining a NP with some X' -phrase to fonn a new phrase of category XP. To account for this paralle lism at the semantic level, I assume that a transitive V' is of type <e,n>, what might be termed a 'property fu nction', meaning that it must combine with some expression to fonn a property expression. I have suggested that the process by which transitive VPs are form ed might appropriat e ly be referred to as 'secondary predication'. Notice, however, that even though they are fonn ally parallel in certain respects, there are fundamental differen ces betwee n PrP and VP. A PrP is what Chomsky (1986) has termed a "complete functional complex" (CFC), meaning that it can stand on its own as a complete 'thought', or 'information unit', as it is tenned in Chierchia and Turner (1988) . A transitive VP, in contrast, is not a CFC in this sense. This diff erence is formally accounted for here by virtue of the fact that propositions are of type p, and therefore have truth-values, whereas transitive verbs, which are of type 1t, do not.
The themy proposed here thus explains both the formal paralle ls betwee n primary and secondary predication, as well as their fundamental difference s.
At this point, let me summarize the previous discussion by comparing the diff erent types of entities assumed in the classical theory and Chierchia's property theory, along with the kinds of syntactic categories they naturall y map onto:
(47) a. properties:7t propositional functions: <c,p> S <-> t IV <-><c,t> TV <-> <C, <c,t» TV rr <-> <c, <c, <e,t»> PrP<-> p Pr' <-> <c,p>
Putting the syntax proposed in § 1 together with the semantics just discussed, propositions will universall y have the fo llowing structure and type assignments:
complement A dittansitive sentence such as John will give a book to Mary will therefore have the fo llowing structure, ttanslations and type assignments:
If any relation is semantic, it is surely the predication relation. Almost without exception, model theoretic acco unts of predication have adopted the ''Fregean'' view that the act of predication consists of "saturating" or "completing" structures that are inherently "unsaturated" or "incomplete". (But see e.g. Aczel (1980) , Bealer (1982) , Jubien (1985) , for an alternative, non-"Fregean" approach to predication.) At the same time, there appears to be strong semantic evidence (Chierchia (1984 (Chierchia ( , 1985 (Chierchia ( , 1989 , Chierchia and Turner (1988) that properties in natural language cannot simply be identified with propositional functions, but must be able to function as individuals, as well. If the arguments discussed so far are correc t, then it turns out, quite remarkably, that the syntacticall y motivated structures required to support a structural theory of predication match up in a simple, "transparent" fashion with the types of entities and operations required in a richer logical language of the sort envisioned by Chierchia. It will be demonstrated shortly that similar results can be achieved in the case of nominal structures, a remarkable, though surely not surprising result A priori, it seems quite unlikely that the structural representations required to represent the syntactic phenomena of natural language will turn out to be related in random and essentially unpredictable ways to the types and operations required to support an explicit semantics for natural language. Probably, everyone would assent to the assumption that an adequate semantic theory must be compositional. The requirement of compositionality ensures that each syntactic rule or substructure be matched by a corre sponding semantic rule or type. However, as Chierchia and Turner (1988, 277) note, "everything else being equal. one would prefer not to have to specify for any given gramm ar, the pairing of syntactic rules with the corre sponding semantic one , on a case-by case basis. One would like such a pairing to follow from general principles."
The considerations put forward thus far strongly suggest that the pairing of syntactic and semantic rules is in fact quite general and universal. I have argued, in particular, that the basic structural relations in sentences are universall y specifiable by applying an extremely restricted version of X'_theory to a small number of lexical and functional categories. The pairing of syntactic categories with semantic types and of syntactic relations with semantic operations is, I claim, fixed within very nanow limits by the principles of universal grammar. Specifically, I have tried to show that the category 'Pr', whose translation is simply 'v, along with its phrasal projections, provides a uniform acc ount of the syntax and semantics of every kind of predication relation encountered in natural language. Given this category and its ttanslation in If, the structul'e and interpretation of the phrasal categories it can project are cmnpletely determined by the principles of X' -theory in the syntax and by the principle of functional application in the semantics.
Similarly, I have shown that expressions of the category VP, unifonn ly paired with properties (expressions of type 'It), have an asymmetrical structure, mirrored in the corre sponding logical representations, which is precisely parallel to the structure of PrP. In particular, the so-called direct object asymmetrically c-comm ands the cmnplements of the verb. Semantically, the V' constituent is an unsaturated expression (as is Pr') which yields a propeny expression when applied to the direct object constituent. I have tried to show that this remarkable parallelism betwee n the internal structure of PrP and VP is empiricall y supported by a wide range of syntactic and semantic considerations.
The remainder of this paper will be devoted to demonstrating a similar transparency in the mapping between the syntactic representation of nominals and their ttanslations in If. At the same time, it will be shown that there is a close paralle lism betwee n sentences and nominals, both in their syntax and in their semantics. The idea that sentences and nominals are fundamentally similar in underlying fonn has been of central importance in the generative ttadition from its inception. The results of this paper confinn in the sttongest possible way the essential cmrectness of that conjecture.
The Syntax of Nominals
Recent work by Abney (1987) , Bowers (1987) , and others has clearly established the necessity for a functional category O(et) in the nominal system. H, as has bee n claimed in this paper (and in more detail in Bowers (1991», Remarkably, the membership of these two classes conesponds almost precisely to the class of strong and weak determiners , respectively, suggesting that there are systematic diff erences in syntactic SbUctme cmrespondin g to the semantic differe nces betwee n them. The observation s in Bowers (1987) provide independent support for this view. There it was shown that the class of elements that characteris tically exhibit SlH:alled "specificity effects" are just the determiners of Class I, i.e. the strong determiners, while the members of Class n typically do not exhibit such effects. It was argued that this difference can be explained in tenn s of the "Barriers " theory if it is assumed that the Class I, but not the Class n, determiners belong to the category D.
The two types of detennin er differ syntacticall y in other ways as well. Members of the first class can never be modified by the special degree elements that modify adjectives and adverbs, while members of the second class (where semantically interpretable) can be: (55) In add ition, determiners of the first class can never be used predicatively, whereas detenniners of the second class typically can:
(57) a. *The men were every. b. ·The boo ks were all. c. ·John is each.
(58) a. The soldiers were few (in number). b. The boo ks were many (in number). c. The cars were three (in number).
All of these facts can be explained if it is assumed that the Class II determiners are simply AP modifiers. Categorizing the weak determiners as adj ectives also has the advantage that virtuall y all of the complex derived quantifiers discussed in Keenan (1988) will automatically be generated in the syntax under standard assumptions concerning the structure of AP:
(59) infinitely/countably/just finitely many, more male than female, at least as many male as fe male, at least n, fewer than n, approximately n, more •.. than ... , at least as many ... as ... , etc.
In Bowers (1987) it was suggested that these determiners were simply attributive APs, hence modifiers of N'. However, this fails to account for the fact that they must always occ ur fm t in a sequence of APs:
(60) a. the many polite young men b. ·the polite many young men c. ·the polite young many men
If, on the other hand, weak determiners are assumed to be Nm' modifiers, parallel to the Pr' modifiers discussed in § 1 .2., this result follows automaticall y. Another argument against my earlier analysis can be derived from the fact that attri butive adj ectives generally pennit replacement of the following N' constituent with the pro-form one, whereas weak detenniners don't:
(61) a. John has good students, while Bill has lousy ones. b. John has many students, while Bill has few (·ones).
Still another observation which support s this analysis is the fact that determiners licensed by Nm cann ot occ ur in gerundive nominals:
(62) *These three (many, few, etc.) singing songs (of John's) must cease.
whereas they can occur in derived nominals:
(63) Those three proofs of the theorem of John's are world famous.
If, as proposed above, the intenn ediate categmy in gerundives is PrP, while derived nominals contain a NmP complement to 0, this result also follows automatically. 3
Finally, a strong argument for distinguishing attributive APs and weak detenn iners structurall y can be derived from Chinese. In Chinese, attributive APs occ ur with the modification marlcer -de, while weak determiners must occ ur with a special class of elements traditionally call ed "classifi ers":
(64) nei san-ben/*de hen hao-del*ben shu those three-cl very good-mod books
As (64) shows, the position of the modification marker and the classif lCl' cannot be interchanged., a fact which can be explained under the proposed analysis if it is assumed that the classifiers are phonetic realizatio ns of Nm, while the modification marlcer -de is generally associated with X-modifiers, and specificall y with N'-modifiers.4
We may tentatively conclude then that the hypothesized intenn ediate categmy Nm exists and that the weak quantifiers are to be analyzed as AP modiflCl'S of Nm', licensed by Nm.
Hence the structure of a phrase such as these three good boo ks would be represented as follows: Now let's consider the argument positions that are available in structures of the sort we have posited for nominals. Again, the null hypothesis is that the structure of sentences and nominals is precisely paralle l Let us assume therefore, as has already been indicated in (53) , that the primary subject position is [Spec, Nm), the secondary subject position is [Spec, N] and that possessive NPs are base generated in [Spec, 0). Obviously the subject and object arguments of NP never occur overtly in S-structure in these positions. This result can be derived by assuming that neither [Spec, N] nor [Spec, Nm) is a case-marlced position in English. Thus structures of the form *[ NmP John three [NP the theorem proo fs)) will never be generated in the S)'Dtax in S-Str'Ucture . How can subjects and objects be realized in S-Str'Ucture in nominals? In two ways: as genitive NPs in [Spec, 0) and as objects of the preposition of. 5 Thus it is a well-known fact that a nominal such as
John's picture is three -ways ambiguous, meaning either (i) 'the picture of John'; (ii) 'the picture by John'; or (iii ) 'the picture that John has'. This follows from our assumptions.
In order to be grammatical, a OP with a base-generated subject or object will have to move to [Spec, 0] (if it is not already fill ed with a possessive) to be case-marked. Since there is only one case-marked position in nominals, the fact that only one argument can be overtly realized in S-structure follows immediately. Note the paralle l betwee n obligatory movement of arguments to [Spec, IP] in sentences and obligatory movement to [Spec, OP] in nominals, in both instances for case-theoretic reasons.
Which positions in the nominal are potential non-theta positions? Obviously [Spec, 0] is. Apparently [Spec, Nm] is also a possible non-theta position, since the internal argument of unaccusatives also shows up in the genitive case: the ball's movement, Mary's app earance, etc.:
The Spec position in NP, on the other hand, is evidently not a non-9 position, as is shown by the well-known observation « Chomsky (197 1» This analysis is quite appealing, though there are some potential problems. Note first that an AP modifier of N' must somehow be prevented from being stranded by the raising of the head Noun, since unmodified APs can never occ ur to the right of an object PP: *the enemy's destruction of the city violent/the enemy's violent destruction of the city.
Second, there is a mass of empirical evidence (see Radford (1988) , for an extensive summ ary of the arguments) suggesting that PP-arguments of the noun must be generated within N', while PP adj uncts must be adj oined to N'. One major piece of evidence in support of this conclusion is the fact that PP-arguments must precede PP-adjuncts: (14) a. student of Physics with long hair b. *a student with long hair of Physics However, this observation is perfectly consistent with the existence of N-Raising, since an NP in [Spec, N] will always precede an N' adj unct in any case. As for the first problem, I will take care of it by showing that there are two types of Nouns: those that raise and those that don't Nouns of the first type take a real object and only occur with Nm' modifiers, while nouns of the second type take an of phrase which is really a PP-complement and can occur with both Nm' and N' modifiers. For nouns of the first type, the correc t surface order is derived by N-to-Nm movement For nouns of the second type, the problem simply doesn't arise.
Action nominals vs. result nominals
The idea that some nouns raise while others don't arise is suggested by the familiar observation that the secondary subjects of action nominals can generall y occur as genitives, while the secondary subjects of result nominals can't:
(75) a. the destruction of the city/the city's destruction If the secondary subject the article fails to be case-marked by of, then it must move successively into [Spec, Nm] and [Spec, D] , producing the second phrase in (75) b. The structure of (76) b., in contrast, is as follows:
(78)
PRO of !'J: theorem in the'journal
As is immediately apparent, NP-movement is impossible in this structure. I shall return shortly to the question of why the head noun also fails to move to Nm. Now consider the adjectival modifiers that are possible with these nominaJizations:
(79) a. The rapid/*interesting publication of the article in the Tun es.
b. The *rapidlinteresting proo f of the theorem in the journal.
The adj ective interesting in (79) b. is an N-modifier, as shown by the fact that it permits one-pronominalization:
(80) John has an interesting proo f of the theorem in this journal, but Mary has an even more interesting one in that journal.
The adj ective rapid in (79) a., in contrast, does not permit one-pronominalization of any kind:
(81 ) a. *We prefer rapid publication of the article in the Times to slow one in the Herald.
b. *We were disappointed by the rapid publication of Mary's article and the slow one of John's.
As was shown earlier, one-pronominalization is a property of N'-modifiers, but not of Nm'-modifiers. Hence it can be concluded that AP modifiers of action nominals are Nm' modifiers, whereas AP modifiers of result nominals are N'-modifiers. This analysis is confirmed by the fact that in the corres ponding sentences a Nm'-modifier of an action nominal translates naturally into a Pr' adverbial modifier, whereas the same is not true for result nominals:
(82) a. They rapidly published John's article in the Times.
b. *John interestingly proved the theorem.
One crucial question remains: why does the head noun raise to Nm in action nominals but not in result nominals? Suppose that action nominals assign 9-roles in exactly the same way that verbs do, while basic nouns and result nominals simply do not assign 9-roles at all. 6 The result would be that action nominals would have to raise to Nm for exactly the same reason that verbs obligatorily raise to Pr, namely, to assign a 9-role to the primary subject in [Spec, N] and [Spec, V] , respectively. Basic nouns and result nominals, on the other hand, would not raise because they don't have any a-roles to assign. This proposal predicts correc tly some further differences between action nominals and result nominals. First, action nominals should be able to OCCur with PRO subjects, while result nominals should not. As Williams (1985) notes, presence of a PRO subject in nominals can be tested for by seeing whether a purpose clause is possible, since purpose clauses are known to be controlled by SUbjects. The result, as predicted, is that action nominals can occ ur with purpose clauses, hence must have PRO subjects: (86) *the city's destruction to prove a point If this analysis is correct, then it can be concluded, not surprisingly perhaps, that action nominals are closer in structure to sentences (and hence to gerundive nominals) than result nominals are. Their interpretation is also different Action nominals refer to events, whereas result nominals refer to classes of individuals. How to represent this diff erence in fonn al semantic terms will be discussed in the next section.
The Semantics of Nominals
If the syntactic analysis of the previous section is correct, then there are three basic kinds of nominals whose semantics must be accou nted for: (i) nominals with Cass n quantifiers only; (ii) nominals with Class I quantiflers (with or without Class n quantifiers in addition); (iii ) action nominals. Cases (i) and (ii), which apply to basic nouns and result nominals, I discuss together; case (iii ) I discuss separately.
Strong and weak determiners
As a first approximation, Cass I determiners have been identified as strong, in the sense of Milsark (1974) and Barwise and Cooper (1981) , and Class n as weak. Milsark's original observation (the "deflniteness restriction", or DR) was that NPs with weak determiners occur in post-copular position in this construction with an existential interpretation, while NPs with strong determiners , if possible at all, do not have an existential interpretation, but rather a "listing" interpretation or else one just identical to the corre sponding non-existential sentence with the quantified NP in subject position:
(87) a. There are many/few/two men in the ganien.
b. There is/are everylthat/most man in the ganien. (88) a. Some student is a vegetarian.
b. Some student who is a vegetarian exists.
A strong determiner such as every, on the other hand, is not existential because (89) b. is always true, while (89) a. can be false:
(89) a. Every student is a vegetarian.
b. Every student who is a vegetarian exists.
Keenan apparendy takes existentiality to be a basic property of individual determiners. If existentiality were indeed an inherent property of weak determiners, that is to say � if the property of existentiality could be shown to be an intrinsic part of the lexical content of quantifiers such as many,/ew, and the cardinal numbers, then we could justifiably conclude that the explanation for the DR is purely semantic. This, however, is not the case, as is shown by another observation due originall y to Milsark ( 1974) . Milsark noted that NPs with weak: detemliners in subject position are ambiguous between a quantificational reading and a cardinal reading. Thus the sentence:
(90) Many men are in the garden. can either mean: (i) 'of the existing men, a large proportion are in the garden', or (ii) ·there are many men in the garden'. The latter interpretation is identical to that of the existential sentence (87) a. The fonn er is quantificational, similar to (87) c., and in this interpretation many is not existential. This shows that the property of existentiality is not somehow intrinsic to the concept of "many-ness". Rather, it appears to be a semantic property that some determiners (the weak: ones) can optionally acquire in the right context, but which other detemliners (the strong ones) cannot There are, then, two questions that have to be answered: (a) how does the property of existentiality arise?; (b) why can some determiners, but not others, acquire it?
According to the theory proposed here, weak: detemliners are categori7ed as adj ectives, while strong detenniners belong to the functional category D. Hence all we need in order to answer (b) is to suppose that some detemliners belong either to the category A or to the category D, while others only belong to the category D. I retmn to this point shortly (There could also be detenniners that only belong to the category A; a good candidate might be the indefmite determiner a.) To answer (a), we have to show that the property of existentiality arises somehow from structures containing adj ectival quantifiers and not from structures containing D quantifiers. I shall now tty to show that the property of existentiality, and hence the DR, can be derived from assumptions (1')-(5') (cf. p. 1), repeated here for convenience: (1') NPs denote propertie s and are therefore assigned the type 11: in If; (2') the semantic function of NmO (like I¥» is to tmn properties into propositional functions, and hence it is translated as ·v, the predication operator; (3') X' adj uncts are uniformly translated as modifiers, from which it fol lows that weak: determiners do not change the type of the expressions they modify; (4') the members of D, in contrast, fo llowing the theory of generalized quantifiers (Montague (1970) In support of this analysis, note first that the fact that weak, but not strong, determiners have the property of existentiality (from which the propertie s of intersectivity and symmetry follow (Barwise and Cooper (198 1) , Keenan (1988») is derived from assumptions (3') and (5'). Weak determiners are, by hypothesis, syntactically Nm'-adjuncts. Therefore by (3') they don't change the type of the propositional function they modify, but rather just specify the cardinality of the set in question. By (5'), the empty D must be interpreted as the existential quantifier in order to tum its NmP complement into a generalized quantifier. Strong determiners, in contrast, are members of D; by hypothesis, they are generalized quantifiers, bence in complementary distribution with the existential quantifier.
Second, the DR follows direcdy from (5'). By hypothesis, Nm converts a NP (of type 11:) into a propositional function (of type <e, p» . However, since weak determiners are Nm' modifiers, they don't change the type of the expressions they modify. Therefore, in order for a NP containing only a weak determiner to be converted into a generalized quantifier, i.e. an expression that combines with a propositional function to yield a proposition, it must first be operated on by the 'default' existential quantifier, as shown above in (91). Finally, returning to Milsark's observation that certain weak quantifiers such as many can have either a quantificational or an existential interpretation , this can be explained by assuming simply that such quantifiers are dually categorized as either A or D. In the first case, a quantifier such as many will receive an existential interpretation; in the second, it will receive a quantificational interpretation.
4.2.
The semantics of action nominals.
The results of the §3.3. show that action nominals are syntactically paralle l in structure to sentences. If the general approac h developed here is correc t, we would naturall y expect to find an equally close paralle l betwee n the semantics of sentences and action nominals. Let us assume therefore that action nouns are expressions of type 11:, <e,X>, or <e, <e,o>, depending on how many argument places they require. We have already assumed that the function of Nm, just like the function of Pr in sentences, is to map property expressions onto propositional functions. Furthermore, since head raising is obligatory in action nominals, we must assume that an action noun assigns (or checks the assignment of) a theta-role to [Spec, Nm) . Hence this position must either be occupied by a lexical NP (which must then move to [Spec, D) to receive case) or by PRO, either of which will saturate the primary subject position in [Spec, Nm) , as required. Some syntactic evidence
